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In this paper, we assess how recent technology advances have changed the way we coordinate. 
After a brief discussion of the common challenges to effective coordination, we highlight some 
important implications of technology on addressing informational and behavioral frictions. We 
focus on discussing the effects of three specific technology developments including artificial 
intelligence (AI), automation, and blockchain, on the choice of coordination modes. We argue 
that technology is shifting the boundaries between firms and markets and is opening the door 
to new research directions. 
 
 





Over the past several decades, academic research has consistently emphasized the role of 
coordination in economic transactions. Examples include Commons (1931), who stresses that 
all types of engagement between human beings are based on coordinated transactions, and 
Hayek (1933) who argues that the operation of economic systems occurs through market 
coordination. The two most common solutions to the coordination problem have been the use 
of markets and firms.1 Many economists have sought to understand where the boundaries 
between firms and markets lie (Coase 1937; Arrow 1969; Williamson 1971, 1973; Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972). In his seminal work on the nature of the firm, for example, Coase (1937) sets 
up a theoretical framework to show that a task should be coordinated within firms when 
transaction costs on markets outweigh that in firms. Extant research argues that boundaries 
between firms and markets are dynamic (Coase, 1960; Williamson 1971), since many factors, 
such as technology advances, can disproportionately change the transaction costs within firms 
and markets and break the current equilibria in coordination modes.  
In this paper, we assess how recent technology advances, including automation, 
artificial intelligence (AI), and blockchain, have changed the way we coordinate. In other 
words, we ask how technological progress has been moving the boundaries between firms and 
markets over the past decade. Given the striking advances in technology during the past 
decades and the disruptions they have caused in many industries (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014; Ford 2015), it is important to examine their impact on forms of coordination, which 
ultimately dictate the allocation of resources, the process of production, and transactions in our 
society.   
This paper differs from, but also complements, a number of recent studies that examine 
the impact of technological developments on various economic outcomes, such as labor 
demand and productivity (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018, 2019a; Graetz and Michaels 2018), 
wage and inequality (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003; Goos and Manning 2007; Michaels, 
Natraj and Van Reenen 2014), entrepreneurial finance (Howell, Niessner and Yermack 2018; 
Yermack 2018), corporate governance (Yermack 2017), central banking (Raskin and Yermack 
2016) and judicial decisions (Kleinberg et al. 2017, 2018), among others. Distinct from these 
                                               
1 We limit our discussion to these two common forms of coordination and aim to provide general implications of 
the change in technology on coordinating economic activities. Other important coordination mechanisms, 
including vertical integration (Williamson, 1971) and coordination through various forms of committees (Farrell 
and Saloner, 1988), among others, are outside of the scope of this discussion.    
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studies that concentrate on specific economic activities, our paper focuses on the fundamental 
coordination problem underlying all economic behaviors (Commons 1931). For example, the 
finding in Graetz and Michaels (2018) that automation using robots increases annual labor 
productivity growth is at least partly driven by a reduction in coordination costs within firms. 
Similarly, the emergence of initial coin offerings (ICOs) as an entrepreneurial financing 
instrument can be understood as a shift of the coordination task from a limited pool of investors 
(e.g., banks, hedge funds, and other institutions) to literally all potential investors with an 
internet access (Howell, Niessner and Yermack 2018). Even judicial decisions on bail and 
discrimination, traditionally coordinated by a specific judge, can now be coordinated by a much 
larger collective wisdom at little cost via machine learning algorithms (Kleinberg et al. 2017, 
2018). Our paper complements these studies by discussing how technology changes the way 
we coordinate and how this impacts various economic outcomes.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two coordination 
approaches, namely coordination through a market or through a hierarchy (firm), discusses the 
common challenges of effective coordination, and presents some general conditions under 
which one approach is preferred to the other. Section 3 discusses how tools created by recent 
technology advances facilitate effective coordination and discusses the implications of specific 
technological developments, including automation, artificial intelligence (AI), and blockchain, 
on the way we coordinate. Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Two common approaches to coordination: Markets versus hierarchies 
In this section, we begin by introducing the two most common approaches to coordination, 
namely coordination through markets and hierarchies (firms). We then discuss the common 
challenges in effective coordination followed by the general conditions under which one 
approach supersedes the other.  
2.1 Concepts of market and hierarchy coordination 
Coordination through the markets is often characterized by economists as a voluntary exchange 
where price serves to coordinate activities, allocate resources, and provide incentives. Sir 
Arthur Salter (Plant 1932) vividly describes the economic system as follows:  
“The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation, it is under no 
central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human 
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need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is 
automatic, elastic and responsive.”  
The voluntary, automatic nature of market coordination has been repeatedly 
emphasized by prominent economists such as Robertson (1923), Robbins (1932) and Hayek 
(1933), among others. However, as noted in Coase (1937), this does not necessarily mean that 
individuals do not choose how to coordinate. In a competitive environment with transaction 
costs, individuals actively choose between alternative approaches of coordination. One such 
important alternative is coordination via hierarchies or firms2.  
Within a hierarchy, activity is coordinated and resources are allocated at least partly by 
command. Market transactions regulated by price movements are reduced in importance3 and 
substituted by an entrepreneur-coordinator within a firm, who allocates resources and directs 
the production process (Coase 1937). Decision makers, i.e., managers and department heads, 
have broad legal rights to determine how resources are used within the organization.  
2.2 Common challenges of effective coordination 
Extant research has highlighted several cost advantages in coordination through hierarchies 
(Coase 1937; Usher 1920; Carlton 1976). For example, the costs of discovering relevant prices 
of various production factors, or negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each 
transaction are typically lower within a firm than in a market.  
Nonetheless, coordinating through firms also faces several challenges. For instance, as 
the size of the firm increases, the costs of organizing additional transactions and allocating 
resources efficiently will rise. This is the so-called diminishing return to management problem 
(Klador 1934; Robinson 1934). As illustrated in Coase’s (1937) framework, there are 
decreasing returns to management when the number of transactions organised in a firm rises. 
For example, entrepreneurs may fail to allocate factors of production to places where they can 
generate the greatest value as firm size increases. Moreover, as a firm becomes larger, the costs 
of organising additional transactions within the firm may also rise. Therefore, the choice of 
whether to coordinate through markets or firms depends critically on the relationship between 
the marginal transaction costs in the firm and the costs of carrying out the same transaction in 
the open market. 
                                               
2 Henceforth, we use coordination through hierarchies and firms interchangeably.  
3  Even within a hierarchy, not all resource allocations are coordinated through command. For example, in 
Lancashire cotton industry, looms and yarn can be obtained on credit (Coase 1937).  
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In addition, the problems of assignment (who gets to decide and when), incentives (how 
should individuals be compensated) and performance evaluation (how should performance of 
individuals within an organisation be evaluated) take on prominence, if activity is coordinated 
within a firm.  
Williamson (1973) stresses that the determinants of transaction costs are largely the 
same in firms and in markets. In his words, “substantially, the same factors that are ultimately 
responsible for market failures also explain failures of internal organization” (Williamson 
1973, p.316). He then summaries these determinants as the frequency with which transactions 
are carried out, the specificity of the asset committed to the transaction, the extent of 
uncertainty over which it becomes difficult to coordinate, the types of opportunistic behavior 
that people are tempted to commit both before and during contract execution and renewal, and 
the limited capacities of individuals to receive, store, retrieve and process information without 
error. The last factor, limited capacity, is also known as bounded rationality. Miller (1956) 
emphasizes that the human brain is not good at processing huge amounts of information. 
Humans are only able to juggle about a half a dozen distinct pieces of information at the same 
time. Williamson (1973) argues that transactions should be coordinated within firms when 
these factors are prominent.  
To facilitate our discussion of the impacts of technological advances on coordination 
approaches, we further categorize these determinants of transaction costs into three common 
challenges of effective coordination, namely imperfect information, asymmetric information 
and behavioral biases. Roughly speaking, imperfect information refers to insufficient 
information; asymmetric information corresponds one side of a contract having more 
information than the other; and behavioral biases refer to situations where we are unable to 
process the information we have in an efficient way.  
Imperfect information can incorporate, but is not limited to the issues of uncertainty, 
specificity, and opportunistic behaviour discussed above. For example, if the specificity of the 
assets committed to a transaction is high, then the potential for opportunistic behavior due to a 
lack of information is likely to be mitigated. Similarly, asymmetric information can also 
include factors such as specificity and opportunistic behavior. Behavioral biases can also 
incorporate factors such as bounded rationality, frequency, and specificity. 
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2.3 Boundaries between firms and markets 
The main reason that one coordination approach is superseded by the other in some situations 
is the relative level of transaction costs involved in these approaches (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1973). Although both approaches incur costs of imperfect information, asymmetric information 
and behavioral biases, the relative weights of these costs are different across the two 
coordination mechanisms. In particular, while information problems are relatively more severe 
in the price mechanism4 , behavioral biases, such as bounded rationality, are likely to be 
comparatively more important in hierarchy coordination.  
 
3. Technology advances and the changing boundaries between firms and markets 
In this section, we first outline potential coordination problems in the age of big data after a 
short review of the common challenges for effective coordination. We then discuss how 
technology advances, including improved data ontology (i.e., the way that data is labelled), 
advanced matching algorithms, and preference-identification machine learning systems, can 
help us mitigate these frictions. Lastly, we describe the implications of specific technology 
advances, including automation, AI, and blockchain on the choices of coordination methods.  
The three common problems of coordination, as discussed in section 2.2 in detail, 
include imperfect information, asymmetric information and behavioral biases. The important 
question we ask here is how improvements in technology are changing the way we approach 
these problems? 
3.1 The problems of big data 
The recent expansion of large observational datasets on social and economic activity with near-
universal coverage makes data ontology, which refers to the way of effectively labelling data5, 
increasingly important (Einav and Levin 2014). On the one hand, the expansion of quality and 
quantity of data offers market participants with more information, and the increased 
information flow, in turn, may level up the playing field on both sides of a contract by 
                                               
4  Henceforth, we follow previous literature and use coordination through markets and the price mechanism 
interchangeably (Coase 1937; Williamson 1973).  
5 The artificial intelligence literature contains many definitions of data ontology; many of these are contradictory 
(Noy and McGuinness, 2001). For the purposes of this paper, we define data ontology as a formal explicit 
description of the characteristics (features and attributes) of observations in a dataset. We refer efficiency of data 
ontology here as the speed and accuracy of describing a feature or attribute of one or many observations in a given 
dataset, and the extent to which the end users can identify the observation with the corresponding data ontology 
at ease.   
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mitigating the incomplete and asymmetric information problems. This is probably what 
regulators prefer. For example, in the US, people selling their cars are required to inform buyers 
of any major accidents the car has been involved in; companies listed on the stock market are 
required to file quarterly financial reports with the stock market regulator, which are then made 
public; banks and investment funds must comply with stringent reporting obligations; firms 
operating in certain sectors (e.g., finance, pharmaceuticals, health care, education, air travel, 
etc.) are required to provide additional information to regulators and the public.  
However, the expansive amount of information also increases the probability of 
behavioral biases. One important type of resultant behavioral bias is that market participants 
can unknowingly change their behaviours while keeping their preferences constant, rendering 
effective policy-making more difficult. For example, consider the “bottomless bowls” 
experiment in Wansink, Painter and North (2012), where one of two groups of participants 
with similar body mass index (BMI) are given self-refilling bowls of soup. Despite consuming 
73% more soup, the group of participants with self-refiling bowls did not believe that they had 
consumed more, nor did they perceive themselves as more sated compared with the other group 
with normal bowls of soup. As economists and regulators often make policy based on 
observational data, more information can create frictions between the inferred and the actual 
preferences of market participants.  
Another problem created by the expansion of data is information overload. In other 
words, it provides us too many options that the human brain is not capable of processing 
efficiently (Miller 1956). For example, suppose you prefer bananas to apples, organic to 
regular, and ripe to green. How do you choose between green conventional bananas and ripe 
organic apples? What dimension is more important to you? What happens if there are more 
dimensions, such as how and where it was grown?  
One possible solution to information overload is to condense available information into 
a single price. But condensing itself has the potential to create additional behavioral biases. 
One such behavioral bias is price anchoring, where retailers would initially propose a fictional 
higher price and then mark it down so consumers feel good about the real price (Wansink, 
Kent, and Hoch 1998). For example, when the iPad was first introduced to the market, Steve 
Jobs first created an artificial reference point price of $999 on the iPad after which the real 
price of $499 had the effect of making the iPad look inexpensive; the Wall Street Burger 




The discussion so far leads us to conclude that, in order to achieve effective 
coordination, we need (i) a standard language to compare preferences; (ii) a tool to better match 
preferences along multiple dimensions and (iii) an effective way to comprehensively capture 
our preferences.  
3.2 Solutions brought by technological development 
Recent technological developments, including improved data ontology, advanced matching 
algorithms, and preference-identification machine learnings systems, can help us mitigate the 
frictions associated with incomplete and asymmetric information as well as behavioral biases. 
In particular, improvements in data ontology, which refers to a way of effectively classifying 
and labelling data, can serve as a standard language that allows us to compare preferences 
across multiple dimensions. One of the problems with the exponential growth in data 
availability is that much of the information, such as emails, web pages, images, audio and video 
files, does not fit neatly into a database field. For example, consider YouTube. Uploaders (i.e., 
sellers) transact with viewers (i.e., buyers) and are often financed by a third group of market 
participants, advertisers. Viewers need to be able to find desired content easily and content 
providers need to be able to make their content quickly discoverable. One solution to this 
problem is to add labels and keywords to the video, but this works only if the uploader picks 
the right keywords. It is relatively easy to label the features of electronics on a specialized 
platform, but it is generally very difficult to do so on a general market like YouTube. With 
improvements in data ontology technology, however, firms are attempting to categorize 
product information automatically. Start-ups such as Alation, Corrigon, and Expertmaker, 
among others, are at the frontline of this technology.  
In addition, developments in matching algorithms enable us to find and select the 
optimal transaction partner. As discussed in section 3.1, one feature of the increasingly rich 
information flow is the difficulty of processing it. In other words, we have too many options to 
filter and select, and thus to identify the optimal match. However, with advances in technology, 
matching algorithms are now available to evaluate sets of multiple preferences and their 
relative weights, and therefore are identifying the best matches for us. The underlying logic is 
straightforward. Preference data is just another data stream forming a particular pattern. Similar 
to analysing patterns in regular data, we can adapt pattern-matching algorithms to help us 
identify optimal transaction partners (Rostek and Yoder 2018). Recent applications of such 
matching algorithms include, but not limited to, Netflix movie recommendations, Spotify, 
Apple Music, and Amazon’s product recommendations.  
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Last but not least, developments in machine learning systems can help us in identifying 
our preferences accurately so that we don’t have to spend time makings these preferences and 
their relative weightings explicit. For reasons of information overload and various behavioral 
biases, it is difficult for us to accurately assess our own preferences, let alone make informed 
decisions based on the preferences. Fortunately, with huge volumes of data and frequent 
feedback for the system, machine learning systems can now identify our preferences accurately 
without the involvement of human social-cognitive skills (Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell 
2015). For example, using a novel dataset that consists 66,732 individuals’ written languages 
on Facebook, Park et al. (2015) build a model that can predict individuals’ personalities. They 
further compare the predicted personality traits with the results of self-reported Big Five 
personality traits6 in a separate sample of 4,824 Facebook users and find that the machine 
learning-based predictions converge with the self-reported personalities and the validity of the 
predictions are stable even in a retest after six months. Another example is from a smartphone 
lending platform, Tala, which offers instant credits (average size of $50) to people in 
underrepresented markets such as Kenya, Tanzania, India, and the Philippines. Tala is able to 
achieve a 90% repayment rate based on a series of behavioral criteria. For instance, if a 
borrower communicates with more than 58 different contacts, he/she is a good borrower 
because he/she has a wider network to depend on; if more than 40% of the entries in a 
borrower’s contact list have both first and last names, it suggests that this borrower is 16 times 
more reliable than one with very few contacts listed with first and last names. These examples 
suggest that (i) human behavior is predictable 7  (in aggregated datasets); and (ii) machine 
learning algorithms are able to facilitate us identifying our preferences accurately.   
In summary, improvements in data ontology should help us extract valuable 
information from huge streams of data and categorize it in many dimensions; advances in 
matching algorithms should enable us to find and select the optimal transaction partner in the 
market of our choice; and machine learning systems should be able to identify our preferences 
as they observe us so that we don’t have to spend time making these preferences (and their 
relative weightings) explicit.  
                                               
6 For more information on the five factor personality traits, see Costa and McCrae (1992). 
7 Evidence so far shows that human behavior is predictable in isolation. However, much of human behavior also 
depends on the immediate environment, causing the formation of emergent behaviors. Evidence on whether 
emergent behaviors are predictable is currently limited.   
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3.3 Implications of AI, automation and blockchain 
In this section, we discuss the implications of three specific technological advances, namely 
AI, automation, and blockchain, on the way we coordinate. Specifically, we highlight the 
mechanisms through which each of these technological developments helps us mitigate the 
problems of effective coordination, namely asymmetric information, incomplete information, 
and behavioral biases. The channels being emphasized here are discussed in detail in section 
3.2, which include data ontology, matching algorithms and machine learning systems.  
3.3.1 AI 
The starting point of AI is the availability of a large dataset along with a set of labels that 
describe the features in the data. The goal is to use this data to train a computer so that it can 
predict labels for a new set of data. For example, one of the AI applications is to train computers 
to identify images. The conventional approach requires substantial domain expertise and 
careful engineering to design a feature identifier that transforms raw images into a useful 
dataset, such as assigning a meaningful and consistent value system to pixels of raw images. 
Transformed data, which is a suitable internal representation of the raw images, are then used 
by the learning subsystem to detect or classify patterns in the raw images (LeCun, Bengio and 
Hinton, 2015). However, this approach was limited in their ability to process natural data in 
their raw form and achieved limited success. The modern approach works directly with the raw 
pixels and allows a learning machine to automatically transform raw inputs into meaningful 
datasets (i.e., images with a suitable internal representation). This has been remarkably 
successful, not only with image recognition but also with voice recognition, language 
translation and other traditionally difficult machine learning tasks (Varian, 2014; 2018). 
How does AI work? Consider deep learning, a subset of machine learning algorithms. 
The basic deep learning algorithm allows computational models that are composed of multiple 
process layers to learn representations of data with multiple levels of abstraction (LeCun, 
Bengio and Hinton, 2015). Representations of data here refer to the transformation of raw data 
into an internal suitable, recognizable system of vectors. As emphasize in Witten et al. (2016), 
with multiple layers of such data transformation, very complex functions can be learned. For 
classification and identification jobs, higher layers of representation emphasize aspects of the 
input that are important for discrimination (e.g., between a white wolf and a Samoyed) and 
suppress irrelevant variations (e.g., different angles of a white wolf). For example, neural 
networks, which are a form of deep learning systems, consist of several layers, with each layer 
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trying to discern more and more complex forms in the data. The last layer will assign a 
probability function to the recognised shape. Figure 1 provides a detailed illustration of how 
neural networks recognize a dog in a photo. The deep learning algorithms only exploded 
recently because of the exponential amount of data that can be generated and stored, and the 
plunge in computing power cost (Nordhaus 2007).  
As discussed in previous sections, machine learning algorithms can help us mitigate 
behavioral biases such as information overload and bounded rationality. In learning our 
preferences through various data (e.g., consumption) generated by ourselves, we don’t have to 
spend time makings these preferences and their relative weightings explicit. As stressed by 
Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell (2015), with huge volumes of data and frequent feedback for 
the system, machine learning algorithms can now identify our preferences accurately without 
the involvement of human social-cognitive skills.   
However deep learning algorithms also have problems. For example, in recurrent neural 
networks, another type of deep learning algorithm, which allows information to persist, if we 
change one object in the dataset, the predicted probabilities on everything else will change 
since they are inter-dependent. This can be better illustrated in an example in Figure 2. The 
difference in panel A and B is the presence of an elephant in the room (panel B). However, the 
probabilities of everything else assigned by the same algorithms change dramatically. This 
problem has significant implications. Consider an autonomous car that goes blind to a 
pedestrian just because a second earlier it passed a turkey on the side of the road. Other 
problematic applications, such as Tay, a Microsoft chat bot that repeated racist tweets, and 
Google’s photo tagging algorithms that identified black people as gorillas, are also worth 
noting. 
  In sum, with its strong ability to identify patterns in complex data, AI development 
can help us with pattern identification, such as the preferences of market participants. In fact, 
many areas have seen successful applications of AI predictions. For example, Kleinberg et al. 
(2017; 2018) show that AI predicted judicial decisions on bail and discrimination are more 
accurate and social-preferable than traditional judge-made ones. However, going from specific 
predicting tasks to general predictions is harder than we think. For example, IBM’s Watson 
beat human contestants on Jeopardy but also made a number of incorrect diagnosis for cancer8. 
In addition, a key requirement for AI to work is to have a sufficiently large training dataset 
                                               
8 See Christie (2018) “Artificial intelligence: Winter is coming” in Financial Times.  
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with well-structured classifications. With today’s data availability and quality, however, this is 
not an extremely difficult task.         
3.3.2 Automation 
Automation is defined as the development and adoption of new technologies that enable capital 
to be substituted for labor in a range of tasks (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019b). An expansive 
body of literature examines the effects of automation on labor supply demand, productivity and 
inequality (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018, 2019a; Graetz and Michaels 2018; Autor, Levy and 
Murnane 2003; Goos and Manning 2007; Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen 2014). The 
question we ask here is in what kind of industries can automation replace humans. The key 
criterion used to evaluate this replacement decision rests on whether we have enough data on 
a specific task on the table.  
To answer this question, we need to go back to the discussions of the coordination 
choice between markets and firms. In markets, we compare our preferences with what is 
available, and then decide whether and with whom to contract. Market participants encounter 
decisions of this kind every time they engage in the market. Therefore, we have lots of data to 
train AI systems. In contrast, data generated within firms, particularly by management, is 
relatively limited. There are several reasons. First, executives in firms face a wide variety of 
different types of decisions. Decisions of a similar type are few, so the data available for a 
particular type of decision is limited. Second, executives face a more varied set of decision 
options than market participants. More data is needed for machine learning systems to work, 
not less. Third, data about the actual process of decision-making is still lacking. Without 
knowing how various inputs were evaluated, weighted, compared, and then translated into a 
decision, machine learning is stunted. Given the diversity of decisions to be made, it is hard to 
imagine machine learning systems taking over general managerial decision-making from 
humans anytime soon.   
3.3.3 Blockchain 
A blockchain is a chain of blocks that each includes a number of ledger entries (Yermack 2017). 
Each entry contains some information of interest. Blockchains are beneficial in three situations, 
where the users want to be pseudonymous; the data is unstructured (use hashes to represent the 
data); and the data needs to be indelible, i.e., no one can alter the data without everyone else 
finding out. The tools brought by blockchain, such as cryptography that protects anonymity, 
13 
 
hashes that represents the data9, and proof-of-work that verifies data, are particularly useful in 
these situations. With these tools, blockchains have advantages of mitigating attendant 
problems of falsification, double-spending, and anonymity.      
An important feature of blockchains is that they can incorporate smart contracts. A 
smart contract is essentially a digital agreement. The main difference between smart and 
traditional contracts is that the clauses are not written in English and executed by lawyers. 
Instead, smart contracts are written in codes, with pre-programmed clauses that automatically 
execute themselves following a set of instructions that work on a principle of “if this happens, 
then execute this”. In other words, the contract is self-fulfilling and caries out what it has been 
coded to do. For example, it is plausible that a person’s will on the disposition of specific types 
of physical assets could be turned into a smart contract, with the rules of how assets should be 
transferred enshrined in codes. Family power plots, squabbles and lies over who gets what 
would be a battle with a computer program. It is important to note that the degree to which 
smart contracts are legally enforceable is still in question and they will not replace lawyers 
altogether. If the language of an insurance policy was unclear, it would still need a qualified 
lawyer to make a judgement.10  
Blockchain has several important implications for corporate structures11. For example, 
it is feasible to incorporate a firm without stock. Ownership and control rights to cash flow can 
be incorporated into smart contracts. Blockchain companies don’t need to adhere to a 
conventional management or financial infrastructure. They may not even need traditional bank 
accounts. As an example, Ethereum has raised funds through a public crowd-sale, backs a free-
floating token, and operates the Ethereum Foundation as a Swiss non-profit corporation. This 
means that most of its value comes from sources that operate outside the legal bounds of 
traditional corporate structure.  
Similarly, blockchain protocols (similar to traditional firms) can now be operated 
without contributors (similar to traditional employees) knowing each other. Blockchain 
protocols are the most distributed “firms” in the world. Their developers and contributors are 
                                               
9 A blockchain contains data and information in blocks with the same size. Each block stores the hashed data from 
the previous block, and new data generated in the current block-forming window, to provide cryptographic 
security. The hashing process uses SHA256 function, which is a one way hash process. It can transform most, if 
not all, types of data (perfect or not) into a hash key, e.g., a series of numbers. For example, written languages, 
transcripts of audio, relational data, descriptions of images (arguably the most common forms of unstructured 
data), can be transformed using the hash function and stored on a blockchain. 
10 This discussion is adapted from Buterin (2014).  
11 For discussions on blockchain and corporate governance, see Yermack (2017). 
14 
 
spread across the globe. In some cases, they are fully anonymous that the team members don’t 
even know each other. Such anonymity can be especially desirable for employees located in 
more strictly regulated locations. Combined with geographical dispersion, anonymity can also 
have important implications for changing the written rules of corporations. For example, norms 
like decision-making based on seniority and other internal politics will not necessarily be 
intuitive, and new rules may have to be written into companies’ software, rather than ingrained 
in their culture. Blockchain “firms” (protocols) are already thinking about solutions to help 
“open organisations” codify their voting, politics, and employee rewards.       
Lastly, with the help of blockchains, we are approaching a state where a firm can be 
operated without assets. Many crypto networks still rely on physical hardware, since Bitcoin 
miners incur costs for electricity and computing rigs. However, newer crypto networks are 
already modelling themselves after the sharing economy. For example, Helium is pioneering a 
hardware device that provides wireless coverage. Users who buy the device can earn tokens 
for keeping it plugged in. Helium could effectively kickstart a decentralized telecom network, 
bypassing the need for capital-intensive mobile towers. Although such initiatives are still at 
their infant stage, they lack the burdens of real estate, labor and, sometimes, a profit motive.    
 
4. Conclusion and future research directions 
Technology is changing the way we coordinate. Developments in data ontology are helping us 
extract valuable data from huge streams of information and categorize it along many 
dimensions; progress in matching algorithms is enabling us to find and select the optimal 
transaction partner in the market of our choice; and machine learning systems are facilitating 
to identify our preferences so that we do not need to spend time to compute our multifaceted 
preferences and their utility-adjusted weightings. The boundaries between markets and firms 
are moving due to the rapid progress in technology. This is because the transaction costs 
incurred in both coordination methods are differentially affected by technology developments. 
Industries that can generate large, high quality datasets are most likely to be affected by the 
advances of technology.  
Regarding future research directions, an area worth exploring, and closely related to 
our work, is how these technological developments will change the optimal size of the firm? 
As emphasized in Coase (1937), when discussing the nature of firm, an important factor that 
determines the size of the firm is management costs, which in turn, are determined by 
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managers’ bounded rationality and firms’ specific tasks. With the current technology 
development in automation, AI, and blockchain, management costs may decrease substantially. 
However, the transaction costs in the market are also reducing. As a result, whether technology 
increases or decreases firm size is in essence an empirical question. In addition, if technology 
increases (or decreases) firm size, what are the mechanisms? Does it slow the speed of 
diminishing return to management (change of the gradient of the marginal return and firm size 
curve)? Or does it reduce the coordination costs at all levels of firm size (change of level of the 
curve)?  
The answers to these questions will have profound implications for firm regulations, 
product market competition, governance as well as industrial structures. Scholarly works that 
seek to understand the implications of each type of technology are also promising. Several 
many research papers examine the impact of AI, blockchains and automation on various 
economic and finance activities (e.g., Fisch, 2019; An, et al., 2019; Acemoglu and Restrepo 
2019b; Kleinberg et al., 2017; 2018). Insights from these studies can shed important light on 
future applications of technology, and consequently improve societal well-being as a whole.    
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